Inductive automation ignition jar files
Depending on their position, they may have everything they need to cause damage, so hopefully they don’t have the motive. Basically –people like you, employees or contractors who have been trusted with details about the system. However, they don’t tend to be very skilled at causing intentional damage inside the SCADA network, although occasionally you’ll have IT people in this position who can unintentionally cause outages simply by accident. Corporate insiders are people who can get inside the corporate network, and tend to be in a very good position to employ social engineering to gain further credentials. Let’s take a look at who might be interested in attacking our systems. If we’re trying to design a cyber attack defense, it is useful to think about who it is who might be attacking us, and what their motives are. Risk Analysis: Who? Insiders Corporate SCADA Organized Crime “Hackers” Intelligence Agencies Military A risk analysis is useful in order to help answer the question of how secure you need to be. In the end how much risk we are willing to accept ends up being a business decision. We want to make sure we are reducing the actual risk we face in the most straightforward way. What we don’t want to do is indulge in security theater, also.
Again – there are ways we might reduce or transfer that risk, but we will end up accepting some of it. A good thought exercise is to consider what would happen if a natural disaster hit your facility. But an some point, there are some risks we must accept. Sometimes we can transfer risk with concepts like insurance. We can, however, make a successful attack extraordinarily difficult and expensive to pull off. As the stuxnet attack showed us, if you become a target of a foreign intelligence service or military, no amount of technology will protect you. Nothing is 100% Secure To make matters worse, we need to acknowledge that nothing is 100% secure. There are dozens of different techniques you might choose to employ in the name of security, each with different cost, implementation difficulty, and feature compromises. Security, both IT-based and more specific SCADA security, is a deep and complex topic.
Security is not a checkbox that you can enable and then rest easy. ☑ Super Secure You might be tempted to think this is a rhetorical question, but it absolutely is not. Making Ignition secure IT Security Security for critical infrastructure Clearing up FUD about Java Our security development plan So with out further ado – let’s explore the question: “How secure do you need to be?”
And because we get so many questions about it, I’d like to briefly clear the air about Java’s security picture, … and then briefly touch on our plans for Ignition as they pertain to security.Ĥ Outline Introduction How secure do you need to be? Then we’ll look at steps you’re going to want to take in order to make Ignition itself secure, followed by a discussion about the different security requirements for critical infrastructure SCADA. We’re going to start with a discussion of figuring out how secure you need to be, because security comes with tradeoffs. In that spirit, even though this session is titled “Steps for Protection your Ignition System”, I’d like to broaden the scope a bit and look at industrial security in general. Let's just say I haven't slept as well since.
Making Ignition secure IT Security Security for critical infrastructure Clearing up FUD about Java Our security development plan When I started to work on this presentation, I did a bit of a deep dive into the field of SCADA security.
#Inductive automation ignition jar files software
Presentation on theme: "Steps for Protecting Your Ignition System"- Presentation transcript:Ģ Steps for Protecting Your Ignition SystemĬarl Gould Co-Director, Software Engineering / Inductive Automationģ Outline Introduction How secure do you need to be?